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Abstract—An artificial-noise (AN)-aided beamformer specific
to correlated main and wiretap channels is designed in this paper.
We consider slow-fading multiple-input-single-output (MISO)
wiretap channels with a passive single-antenna eavesdropper,
in which independent transmitter-side and correlated receiver-
side are assumed. Additionally, the source has accurate main
channel information and statistical wiretap channel information.
To reduce the secrecy loss due to receiver-side correlation,
this paper proposes the scheme of channel-correlation-enabled
transmit optimization. Particularly, the correlation is viewed as
a resource to acquire more knowledge about wiretap channel.
Based on this, the statistical distribution of wiretap channel is
described more precisely. Then, the power of AN in the null
space of main channel is placed more reasonably instead of
simple uniform distribution and an elaborate beamformer for
the information-bearing signal is designed. Finally, an efficient
algorithm for power allocation between the information-bearing
signal and the AN is developed. Simulation results show that the
secrecy rate under transmit power and secrecy outage constraint
is improved.
Index Terms—Receiver-side correlation, AN-aided beamform-
ing, secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
W Ith the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm developing,an exponential increase of wireless devices along with
many new applications beyond personal communications can
be expected in the future [1], [2]. A mass of access entities
indisputably cause high device densities, which results in
more serious security threats [3]. In addition to cryptography-
based secrecy methods implemented at upper layers, physical
layer security (PHY-security) techniques, by exploiting the
random nature of physical layer transmission media to achieve
both confidentiality and authentication [4], also have attracted
considerable attention. As an alternative to cryptography-
based secrecy methods, PHY-security techniques, through
proper coding and signal processing, ensure that confidential
messages can be decoded with lower complexity only by
the destination [5]. Compared to cryptography-based secrecy
methods, PHY-security has some obvious advantages [6].
For instance, PHY-security can guarantee information secrecy
regardless of eavesdroppers’ computational capability, which
leads to that perfect secrecy can be achieved at the physi-
cal layer alone. Additionally, the centralized key distribution
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and management requested by cryptographic techniques can
be eliminated by employing PHY-security techniques, with
facilitating the management and improving the efficiency of
wireless communications [7].
In PHY-security, artificial-noise (AN)-aided beamforming
techniques are typically utilized to strengthen secrecy. Beam-
forming aims to enhance the signal quality at the destination
while limiting the signal strength at the eavesdropper; AN
inserted into the transmit signal helps to degrade the recep-
tion at the eavesdropper. The authors in [8] concluded that
transmitting the information-bearing signal in the direction
of main channel is optimal to maximize the secrecy rate if
only the statistics of wiretap channel are known. From the
perspective of the average effect, this scheme is also applied
to slow-fading channels. In [9], AN was utilized to degrade
the signal quality at the eavesdropper and was placed only in
the null space of main channel with an isotropic distribution
to avoid jamming the reception at the destination. The authors
in [10] proved that AN in the null space of main channel
must be symmetrical to maximize the secrecy when main
and wiretap channels are independent of each other. When
the desired signal was transmitted in the direction of main
channel and AN was uniformly generated in the null space
of main channel, the authors in [11] derived a closed-form
expression for power allocation for minimizing the secrecy
outage probability. Nevertheless, the scheme that full AN
power is placed only in the null space of main channel is
not optimal. This is because, when a part of AN power is
placed in the direction of main channel, it is still possible
that the net secrecy rate increases despite interference with the
destination. The authors in [12] showed that the optimal AN
is always orthogonal to the information-bearing signal for the
maximum secrecy rate under the secrecy outage constraint and
derived the optimal power allocation between the information-
bearing signal and the AN without any approximation. In all
these works, AN-aided beamforming techniques are discussed
with the ideal assumption that main and wiretap channels are
statistically independent of one another.
Some scenarios exist where main and wiretap channels are
statistically correlated, that is, correlation occurs on receiver-
side. The correlation is harmful to the transmission security
[13], and excessively large signal power provides less benefit
[14]. In wireless environment, the extent of channel correlation
often depends on some factors such as radio scattering, prox-
imity and antenna deployments [14]. For example, antenna
deployment at high altitudes in rural or suburban areas gener-
ates dominant line-of-sight paths, resulting in the correlation
2between the receive signals at two receivers. Moreover, it is
also possible for the eavesdropper to actively induce the cor-
relation by approaching the destination [15]. Considering that
the aforementioned existing AN-aided beamforming schemes
are not specific to the situation of correlated main and wiretap
channels, the achievable secrecy may be not good enough. On
the other hand, to reduce the secrecy loss due to correlation
between main and wiretap channels, the channel fluctuation
between antennas, users and relays is often exploited, which
is followed by opportunistic selection implemented in a cen-
tralized or distributed manner through dedicated feedback links
[15], [16]. For example, the authors in [14] proposed that the
secrecy could be enhanced by opportunistically transmitting
messages in time slots instead of blindly increasing signal
power. In particular, confidential transmission occurs when
main channel has better instantaneous channel gain than
that of wiretap channel. As another example, the authors in
[17] presented a scheme where transmit antenna selection is
performed at the source, and the best relay is chosen for better
transmission security. Further, the authors in [18] studied the
impact of both channel correlation and outdated relay selection
on the secrecy performance. In addition to the strategy of
opportunistic selection, a DCE scheme was proposed to en-
hance the secrecy for correlated main and wiretap channels in
[19]. In [20], AN wss emitted by the full-duplex destination in
order to create interference to the eavesdropper. This strategy
is highly desirable for correlated main and wiretap channels. In
[21], multiple cooperative jammers were employed to interfere
with the reception at the eavesdropper efficiently, aiming at
reducing the disadvantage due to the correlation.
A. Scope of Work
AN-aided beamforming design based on channel correlation
for correlated multiple-input-single-output (MISO) wiretap
channels has been partly studied in [22], and the improvement
and completion are conducted in this paper. Compared to
the existing AN-aided beamforming strategies, the channel
correlation information is utilized as a resource to help im-
prove the secrecy in this paper. We seek to maximize the
secrecy outage constrained secrecy rate by optimizing the AN-
aided beamformer. The main contributions of our work are
summarized as follows.
(1) A simple and practical formula, describing the channel
model of correlated MISO wiretap channels precisely, is
derived. Through this formula, it is easy to observe that
wiretap channel consists of both determinate and random
components. Additionally, the relationship between main
and wiretap channels is explained from the point of view
of multipath effects. Based on this model, many problems
in the scenario of correlated MISO wiretap channels can
be conveniently studied.
(2) A channel-correlation-enabled AN-aided beamformer is
designed to improve the secrecy for correlated MISO
wiretap channels. Since the channel correlation suggests
some useful information, which can be utilized to esti-
mate the statistical distribution of wiretap channel more
precisely, the power of the AN in the null space of
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Fig. 1: Illustration of correlated main and wiretap channels.
main channel is placed more reasonably instead of sim-
ple uniform distribution. Moreover, the beamformer for
information-bearing signal can be optimized with better
secrecy performance.
(3) An efficient algorithm for power allocation between the
information-bearing signal and the AN is developed.
Based on this, the achievable secrecy rate under the
transmit power and secrecy outage constraint for cor-
related MISO channels can be obtained. By contrast,
the secrecy performance the proposed suboptimal power
allocation algorithm achieves approximates to that of
the one-dimensional line brute-force search method with
much less computing time.
B. Paper Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, the system model of correlated MISO wiretap
channels is built. Based on this, the optimization problem
is formulated to maximize the target secrecy rate under
the secrecy outage probability and total power constraint.
In section III, channel-correlation-enabled transmit optimiza-
tion is studied, which involves correlation-based AN design,
correlation-based beamforming design and power allocation
between the information-bearing signal and the AN. Section
IV presents simulations, and the numerical results demonstrate
that the proposed channel-correlation-enabled transmit scheme
can reduce the secrecy loss significantly for correlated MISO
wiretap channels. Section V presents the conclusions of this
work.
Notations: Boldfaced lowercase and uppercase letters are
used to represent vectors and matrices, respectively. All vectors
are column vectors. The notations (·)H , ⊗, E[·], Tr(·), and
| · | denote the conjugate transpose operation, the convolution
operation, the mathematical expectation, the trace, the modulus
of a complex number. ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a
vector or the Frobenius norm of a matrix. Re(·) is used to
extract the real part of its argument.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a multiple-input single-
output single-antenna eavesdropper (MISOSE) system over
slow-fading channels, where an Ns-antenna source (Alice)
sends confidential messages to a single-antenna destination
3(Bob) with the transmission overheard by a passive single-
antenna eavesdropper (Eve). Assuming that Alice has accurate
channel state information (CSI) of the Alice-Bob link denoted
by h ∈ CNs×1 and statistical CSI of the Alice-Eve link
denoted by g ∈ CNs×1, with all elements of both chan-
nels following independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
complex Gaussian distribution. Additionally, the transmitter-
side is independent, whereas the receiver-side is correlated.
In other words, the subchannels from the different transmit
antennas to the same receive antenna are independent while
those from the same transmit antenna to Bob and Eve are
correlated. As shown in Fig. 1, the solid and dashed lines
having the same colors characterize the correlation, while each
color symbolizes the independence.
For the transmitter-side independence, it can be justified in
the scenarios where the transmit antennas are surrounded by
abundant scatterers and reflectors or the transmit antenna spac-
ing is big enough to exploit the spatial multiplexing effect. For
example, some micro base stations may be intentionally de-
ployed in the position with abundant scatterers and reflectors in
ultra-dense networks (UDNs). Mathematically, the transmitter-
side independence is specified by h ∼ CN (0, σ2dINs) and
g ∼ CN (0, σ2eINs) , where σ2d and σ2e are their channel gain
variances, respectively. The receiver-side correlation occurs
in the scenarios where Eve is around Bob and there are
poor scatterers and reflectors locally around the two adjacent
receivers. The correlation between channels from Alice to Bob
and Eve can be characterized by the joint power probability
density function (PDF) of their correlated SISO channels [13],
that is,
fh2i ,g2i (x, y) =
I0(
2
1−ρi
√
ρixy
σ2
d
σ2e
)
(1− ρi)σ2dσ2e
e
−
x
σ2
d
+
y
σ2e
1−ρi , (1)
where hi and gi denote the subchannel gains from the i-th an-
tenna at Alice to Bob and Eve, respectively (i = 1, 2, · · · , Ns).
The function I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first
kind of order zero [23], which is given by
I0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(
xk
2kk!
)2
. (2)
ρi = cov(h
2
i , g
2
i )/
√
var(h2i )var(g
2
i ) is the power correlation
coefficient between main and wiretap subchannels. As Eve
keeps passive near Bob, it is reasonably assumed that Eve is
spatially randomly located around Bob. In a wireless environ-
ment, as a slow-varying statistical variable, the power correla-
tion coefficient between main and wiretap subchannels in the
specific regional scope around Bob can be estimated, with the
maximum estimated value corresponding to ρi. Undoubtedly,
ρi ∈ [0, 1) describes the degree of correlation in the worst
case. In particular, ρi = 0 denotes the independent subchannel
scenario, while |ρi| = 1 in the extreme case indicates that
h2i and g
2
i are completely correlated. In conclusion, h and g
consist of Ns independent pairs of correlated SISO channels
from Alice to Bob and Eve.
Since hi remains constant and gi as a variable is related to
hi in a block, g
2
i is conditional on h
2
i . Thus, the PDF of g
2
i is
determined by the joint power PDF of h2i and g
2
i divided by
the PDF of h2i , that is,
fg2i |h2i (x|yi) =
fg2i ,h2i (x, yi)
fh2i (yi)
, (3)
where fg2i |h2i (x|yi) is the PDF of g2i conditional on h2i and yi
is the instantaneous value of h2i in this block. For h
2
i , it is a
χ2 random variable with two degrees of freedom across a lot
of blocks, whose PDF is
fh2i (y) =

1
σ2d
e
− y
σ2
d , y > 0 (4a)
0 , y ≤ 0. (4b)
Thus,
fg2i |h2i (x|yi) =
 e
−
s2i+x
2σ2
i
2σ2i
I0(
si
σ2i
√
x), x > 0 (5a)
0 , x ≤ 0. (5b)
where
σ2i =
(1− ρi)σ2e
2
, (6)
si =
√
yiρiσ2e
σ2d
. (7)
From (5), it is not difficult to find that g2i is a noncentral
χ2 random variable with two degrees of freedom. Thus, the
wiretap channel can be modeled as
gi =
σe
√
ρi
σd
hi + σe
√
1− ρiz, (8)
where z is a zero-mean unit-variance complex Gaussian vari-
able. Thus, it can be concluded that each element gi of wiretap
channel is a complex Gaussian variable with its mean and
variance being σe
√
ρi/σd · hi and σ2e(1− ρi) considering that
hi is determinate in a block by the CSI feedback. From the
point of view of multipath effects, the reason why hi and gi are
correlated is that they have some common unsolvable paths.
Let Θ = diag {ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρNs} and z ∼ CN (0, INs) . The
wiretap channel is further formulated as
g =
σe
σd
h˜+ σez˜, (9)
where
h˜ =
√
Θh, (10)
z˜ =
√
INs −Θz. (11)
B. Problem Formulation
When Alice transmits a signal x ∈ CNs×1, the signals
received at Bob and Eve are, respectively,
4yd = h
Hx+ nd, (12)
ye = g
Hx+ ne, (13)
where nd and ne denote the zero-mean unit-variance additive
white complex Gaussian noises at Bob and Eve. To enhance
the security, AN-aided beamforming scheme is employed for
transmission. Since it is difficult to optimize the generalized
AN design, we simplify the AN design by placing AN only
in the null space of h. Specifically, the transmit signal vector
x, consisting of both the message-bearing signal and the AN,
is constructed as
x =
√
φPws+
√
(1 − φ)Pa, (14)
where w is a beamformer for transmitting the information-
bearing signal s. P denotes the total transmit power and φ is
the fraction of P allocated to the information-bearing signal.
a is the normalized AN vector in the null place of h with
hHa = 0. Then, the SNRs at Bob and Eve are given by
δd = φP
∣∣hHw∣∣2 , (15)
δe =
φP
∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + (1− φ)P |gHa|2 . (16)
Given the received SNRs at Bob and Eve, the secrecy
capacity over a block consisting of a large number of symbols
is given by
Cs = [Cm − Cw]+ , (17a)
=max {Cm − Cw, 0} , (17b)
=max
{
log
(
1 + δd
1 + δe
)
, 0
}
. (17c)
In slow-fading channels, we use the secrecy outage probability
to evaluate the secrecy performance of system. The secrecy
outage probability is characterized as
Pout (Rs) = Pr {Cs < Rs} , (18)
that is, the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity
Cs is less than the target secrecy rate Rs. Our objective is
to maximize the target secrecy rate under the secrecy outage
constraint. The problem is formulated as
max
a,w,φ
Rs, (19a)
s.t. pout (Rs) ≤ ε, (19b)
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, (19c)
where ε ∈ [0, 1) is a required secrecy outage probability.
III. CHANNEL-CORRELATION-ENABLED TRANSMIT
DESIGN
Since the chance constrained AN-aided beamforming design
(19) is non-convex, it is not likely to be solved efficiently. To
make the problem tractable, we first find the suboptimal a
that determines the AN power distribution in the null space
of h. Once a is determined, the interference can be viewed as
a constant for fixed P and φ. Then, the optimization of the
beamformer w for transmitting the information-bearing signal
is studied. Finally, we develop an efficient algorithm to find the
suboptimal power allocation between the information-bearing
signal and the AN. Through such three steps, the suboptimal
solution to AN-aided beamforming design can be finalized.
In this process, the channel correlation information is fully
utilized as a resource to help improve the secrecy by describing
the statistical distribution of wiretap channel more precisely.
A. Correlation-Based AN Design
The optimization problem (19) is non-convex and hard to
be solved analytically. Even so, we can find the suboptimal
scheme of AN power distribution in the null space of h.
Specifically, for any fixed P and φ, according to Markov
inequality [24],
Pr {Cs ≥ Rs} ≤ E [Cs] /Rs. (20)
Thus,
Rs ≤ log (1 + δd)− E {log (1 + δe)}
1− ε . (21)
Clearly, the minimization of E {log (1 + δe)} contributes to
the maximization of Rs.
Let
Φ(x) = log
[
1 +
φP
∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + (1− φ)Px
]
. (22)
The second derivative of the function Φ(x) is given by
Φ′′(x) =
φ(1 − φ)P 3 ∣∣gHw∣∣2
ln 2 [1 + (1− φ)Px]2
× φ(1 − φ)P
3
∣∣gHw∣∣2[
1 + φP |gHw|2 + (1− φ)Px
]2 . (23)
Clearly, Φ′′(x) > 0 must hold true for any x with φ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, Φ(x) is a convex function of x. According to Jensen’s
inequality, it is not difficult to find
Φ (E[x]) ≤ Ex [Φ(x)] , (21)
where Ex[·] denotes the mathematical expectation over x.
Replacing x with ξ2 =
∣∣gHa∣∣2, we observe that the increase
of E
[
ξ2
]
helps reduce Φ
(
E[ξ2]
)
, which is the lower bound of
Eξ
[
Φ(ξ2)
]
= E [log (1 + δe)]. As a result, the maximization
of Rs is facilitated.
Let ρ0 = min {ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρNs}. According to (9),
g =
σe
√
ρ0
σd
h+
σe
σd
h˜− σe
√
ρ0
σd
h+ σez˜. (22)
Considering hHa = 0, it is easy to find
5gHa = g˜
H
a, (23a)
=
[
σe
σd
h˜− σe
√
ρ0
σd
h+ σez˜
]H
a. (23b)
We observe that g˜i denoting the the element of g˜, is a
complex Gaussian variable with its mean and variance being
σe
(√
ρi −√ρ0
)
/σd ·hi and σ2e(1−ρi), Thus, the interference
created by AN is given by
E
{∣∣gHa∣∣2} = Ns∑
i=1
a2iE
{
g˜i
2
}
, (24a)
=
Ns∑
i=1
a2i (2σ
2
i + s˜i
2), (24b)
where ai is the element of a and s˜i
2
is given by
s˜i
2 =
σ2e(
√
ρi −√ρ0)2h2i
σ2d
. (25)
Based on these discussions, we consider the following
optimization problem.
max
a
J =
Ns∑
i=1
a2iE
{
g˜i
2
}
, (26a)
s.t. hHa = 0, (26b)
Tr(aaH) =
Ns∑
i=1
a2i ≤ 1. (26c)
Although the optimization problem (26) is non-convex, we can
apply augmented Lagrangian method to find its solution. For
(26), the augmented Lagrangian is constructed as
L(a, µ, ν) = J +
1
2κ
{[
max
{
0, µ+ κTr(aaH)
}]
)2 − µ2}
+ νhHa+
κ
2
|hHa|2, (27)
where µ and ν are the multipliers and κ is the penalty
parameter. The formulas used to update the multipliers are
given by
νk+1 = νk + κh
Hak, (28)
µk+1 = max
{
0, µk + κTr(aka
H
k )
}
, (29)
and the judgement function is given by
φk(a) =
{
|hHak|2 +
[
max
{
−Tr(akaHk ),
µk
κ
}]2}1/2
.
(30)
The procedure to solve the problem (26) is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
By a series of processing in this subsection, the suboptimal
AN vector a in the null space of h is obtained. It is not difficult
to find that a only depends on h and the statistical distribution
Algorithm 1 Optimization of AN
Input: ρi, σd, σe, h, etc.;
Output: a;
1: Initialize: a, µ, ν, κ, ε, T, t = 1, 0 < θ < 1, c > 1;
2: repeat
3: p = φ(a);
4: a← argmin
a
{L(a, µ, ν)};
5: if φ(a) < ǫ then
6: break;
7: if φ(a) ≥ θ × p then
8: κ = min {1000, c× κ} ;
9: ν ← ν + κhHa;
10: µ← max{0, µ+ κTr(aaH)} ;
11: t← t+ 1;
12: until t < T
of g, and has nothing with the beamformer w for transmitting
the information-bearing signal. Clearly, this result makes it
easy to design the beamformer w.
B. Correlation-Based Beamforming Design
For fixed P and φ, with AN power distribution in the null
space of h is obtained, the chance constrained optimization
problem (19) is simplified into
max
w
Rs, (31a)
s.t. pout (Rs) ≤ ε, (31b)
wHw ≤ 1. (31c)
However, the problem (31) is still non-convex and is not likely
to be solved directly. According to [25], [26], the problem (31)
is equivalently reformulated as a probability constrained power
minimization problem with the target rate Rs > 0 as follows.
min
w
wHw, (32a)
s.t. pout (Rs) ≤ ε. (32b)
For any given target secrecy rate Rs, the optimal solution w
∗
must exist. Besides, the optimal objective value w∗Hw∗ of the
above problem is monotonically increasing with respect to Rs.
Taking the two points into account, the target secrecy rate R∗s
enabling the optimal objective value w∗Hw∗ = 1 can be found
by using a bisection search over different Rs. Clearly, R
∗
s must
be the optimal solution to the problem (31). The procedure of
searching R∗s is summarized in Algorithm 2.
In the following, we focus on the probability constrained
power minimization problem with the given target rate Rs.
Similar to [25], we employ the approach of relaxation-
restriction to solve this problem: the chance constraint is
conservatively transformed into a deterministic form (the
restriction step) and then an semidefinite relaxation (SDR)
is performed to lift the problem into a high dimension (the
relaxation step).
6Algorithm 2 Bisection Search
Input: ε, φ, P, h, a, fgi(x), etc.;
Output: R∗s ;
1: Initialize: ǫ, Ru and Rl;
2: repeat
3: R∗s ← (Ru +Rl)/2;
4: if pout (R
∗
s) ≤ ε then
5: if wHw ≤ 1 then
6: Rl = R
∗
s ;
7: else
8: Ru = R
∗
s ;
9: else
10: Ru = R
∗
s ;
11: until |Ru −Rl| < ǫ
1) Conservative Transformation: For the chance constraint
(32b), it can be reformulated as
pout (Rs) = Pr
{
log
(
1 + φP
∣∣hHw∣∣2)
− log
[
1 +
φP
∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + (1− φ)P |gHa|2
]
≤ Rs
}
. (33)
Further, it can be rewritten as
Pr
{
ω < φP
∣∣gHw∣∣2 − (1 − φ)Pω ∣∣gHa∣∣2} , (34)
where
ω = 2−Rs
(
1 + φP
∣∣hHw∣∣2)− 1, (35)
∣∣gHa∣∣2 = Ns∑
i=1
a2i g˜i
2. (36)
From (9), we observe that the wiretap channel g consists
of two parts: the deterministic component σe/σd · h˜ and the
stochastic component σe · z˜. Substituting (9) into
∣∣gHw∣∣2, it
can be rewritten as
∣∣gHw∣∣2 = (σe
σd
h˜+ σez˜
)H
wwH
(
σe
σd
h˜+ σez˜
)
, (37a)
=
σ2e
σ2d
h˜
H
wwH h˜+ σ2e z˜
H
wwH z˜
+
2σ2e
σd
Re
(
z˜
H
wwH h˜
)
. (37b)
Similarly,
∣∣gHa∣∣2 can be rewritten as
∣∣gHa∣∣2 = σ2e
σ2d
h˜
H
aaH h˜+ σ2e z˜
H
aaH z˜
+
2σ2e
σd
Re
(
z˜
H
aaH h˜
)
. (38)
Noting that aaH is a diagonal matrix because a is a random
Gaussian noise vector. Thus, (34) can be rewritten as
Pr
{
ω − σ
2
e
σ2d
h˜
H
Ah˜ < zHΛz+ 2Re
(
zHx
)}
, (39)
where
A = φPwwH − (1 − φ)PωaaH , (40)
Λ = σ2e
√
INs −ΘA
√
INs −Θ, (41)
x =
σ2e
σd
√
INs −ΘAh˜. (42)
Lemma 1 (Bernstein-Type Inequality I): Let G = zHΛz +
2Re
(
zHx
)
, where Λ ∈ CN×N is a complex Hermitian
matrix, z ∼ CN (0, IN ) and x ∈ CN×1. Then for any σ ≥ 0,
we have
Pr
{
G ≥ Tr (Λ) +
√
2σ
√
‖ vec (Λ) ‖2 +2 ‖ x ‖2
+σs+ (Λ)
}
≤ exp(−σ), (43)
where s+ (Λ) = max {λmax (Λ) , 0} with λmax (Λ) denoting
the maximum eigenvalue of matrix Λ.
Clearly, Lemma 1 can bound the tail probability of quadratic
forms of Gaussian variables involving matrices. According
to Lemma 1 and (39), the chance constraint (32b) can be
conservatively transformed into the following deterministic
form:
Tr (Λ) +
√
2σ
√
‖ vec (Λ) ‖2 +2 ‖ x ‖+ σs+ (Λ)
≤ ω − σ
2
e
σ2d
h˜
H
Ah˜, (44)
where σ = − ln(ε). In other words, if (44) is true, then the
chance constraint the chance constraint (32b) must hold true.
Consequently, the relaxed problem (32) is now conservatively
reformulated as
min
w
wHw, (45a)
s.t. (44). (45b)
2) Semidefinite Relaxation: Define W
△
= wwH . It is easy
to find that (45) is equivalent to
min
w
Tr (W) , (46a)
s.t. (44), (46b)
W  0, rank(W) = 1. (46c)
The problem (46) can be relaxed again by using the semidef-
inite relaxation (SDR) approach to drop the rank constraint
rank(W) = 1. The rank relaxed problem becomes
7min
w
Tr (W) , (47a)
s.t. (44),W  0. (47b)
It is easy to see that the above problem is equivalent to the
following problem
min
w
Tr (W) , (48a)
s.t. Tr (Λ) +
√
2σα+ σβ − c ≤ 0, (48b)
c = ω − σ
2
e
σ2d
h˜
H
Ah˜, (48c)∥∥∥∥ vec (Λ)√2x
∥∥∥∥ ≤ α, (48d)
βI−Λ  0, β > 0,W  0, (48e)
where α and β are slack variables. This problem has a linear
objective, a second order cone constraints and two convex
PSD constraints. Therefore, it is a convex problem and can
be solved by using off-the-shelf convex optimization solvers.
However, due to the rank relaxation, there is no guarantee that
the resulting optimal solution W is feasible for the original
problem (46). To obtain a feasible rank-one solution ŵ, we
employ a simple Projection Approximation Procedure which
is proposed in [25]. Specifically, the feasible ŵ can be given
by the following three steps:
i. Let P denote the project matrix of vector W1/2h˜, that is,
P =
W1/2h˜
(
W1/2h˜
)H
‖W1/2h˜ ‖2 ; (49)
ii. We construct a new rank-one solution
Ŵ = W1/2PW1/2; (50)
iii. Since Ŵ is a rank-one complex Hermitian matrix, we can
obtain ŵ from Ŵ By SVD method. Specifically,
Ŵ =QΣQH (51a)
=(QΣ1/2)
(
QΣ1/2
)H
(51b)
=ŵŵ
H
. (51c)
According to [25], this simple scheme is guaranteed to find a
rank-one solution which has performance no worse than W∗.
C. Power Allocation
For any fixed P and φ, the AN power distribution in
the null space of h and the correlation-based beamformer
can be determined by the previous two subsections. In the
following, we focus on optimizing power allocation between
the information-bearing signal and the AN. Although the
optimal power allocation coefficient can be obtained by a
one-dimensional line brute-force search within [0, 1], it is
inefficient. Thus, we will develop an efficient algorithm.
According to (21), we observe that Rs can be enlarged by
maximizing
C(φ) = log (1 + δd)− E {log (1 + δe)} . (52)
Clealy, the rate paid for preventing being eavesdropped is
E {log (1 + δe)}. Let
H(φ) = log
(
1 + φP
∣∣hHw∣∣2)
− log
{
1 +
φP
∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + (1− φ)P |gHa|2
}
. (53)
Clearly, H(φ) can be viewed as a reference guide for the
variation trend of C(φ). For H(φ), its first derivative is given
by
H ′(φ) = H ′1(φ) −H ′2(φ), (54)
where
H ′1(φ) =
1
ln 2
P
∣∣hHw∣∣2
1 + φP
∣∣hHw∣∣2 , (55)
H ′2(φ) =
1
ln 2
P
∣∣gHw∣∣2 (1 + P ∣∣gHa∣∣2)
1 + (1− φ)P |gHa|2
× 1
1 + (1− φ)P |gHa|2 + φP |gHw|2 . (56)
From (53), we observe that the first and second terms of
H(φ) both rise with the increase of φ. According to (55)
and (56), the denominators of their derivatives H ′1(φ) and
H ′2(φ) are the linear function and the quadratic function of
φ, respectively. In the situation of (53), there may exist two
cases: i) H ′1(φ) declines continually with φ increasing while
H ′2(φ) rises first then declines with φ increasing (WhenH
′
2(φ)
declines, its rate is below H ′1(φ)); ii) both of H
′
1(φ) and
H ′2(φ) decline with φ increasing and the decline rate of H
′
1(φ)
is higher than H ′2(φ). In either case, it can be concluded
that H ′(φ) is monotonically decreasing with respect to φ
and there exists only one extreme point for H(φ) within
φ ∈ (0, 1). These results cursorily reflect that φ corresponding
to the maximum value of C(φ) = 0 is confined to a small
range. Therefore, for the problem (19), the power allocation
coefficient φ∗ between the information-bearing signal and the
AN can be obtained by the following three steps: i) the root
φ0 of C
′(φ) = 0 is extracted by bisection method. Clearly, φ0
is the value of φ at the rough extreme point of C(φ). ii) φ0
can be used as an initial value to execute brute-force search
within a narrow range around φ0 so as to find a better power
allocation coefficient φ∗ for the problem (19).
To compute the achievable secrecy rate, fδe(x) representing
the PDF of δe is necessary. Let ζ = g
Hw. ζ can be expanded
into
8ζ =
Ns∑
i=1
(gix − jgiy) (wix + jwiy) , (57a)
=
Ns∑
i=1
gixwix + giywiy + j
Ns∑
i=1
gixwiy − giywix. (57b)
Considering that gi is a complex Gaussian variable with
its mean and variance being σe
√
ρi/σd · hi and σ2e(1 −
ρi),
∑Ns
i=1 gixwix + giywiy is also a complex Gaus-
sian variable with its mean and variance being σe/σd ·
Re
(
h˜
H
w
)
= σe/σd ·
∑Ns
i=1
√
ρi (hixwix + hiywiy) and σ
2
e/2·
|√INs −Θw|2 = σ2e/2·∑Nsi=1(1−ρi) (w2ix + w2iy). Similarly,∑Ns
i=1 gixwiy − giywix is a complex Gaussian variable with
its mean and variance being σe/σd · Im
(
h˜
H
w
)
= σe/σd ·∑Ns
i=1
√
ρi (hixwix − hiywiy) and σ2e/2 · |
√
INs −Θw|2 =
σ2e/2 ·
∑Ns
i=1(1 − ρi)
(
w2ix + w
2
iy
)
. Thus, ζ2 =
∣∣gHw∣∣2 is a
noncentral χ2 random variable with two degrees of freedom.
Thus, the PDF of ζ2 is given by
fζ2(x) =

e
−
s2
ζ
+x
2σ2
ζ
2σ2ζ
I0(
sζ
σ2ζ
√
x), x > 0 (58a)
0 , x ≤ 0. (58b)
where
σ2ζ =
σ2e
2
· |
√
INs −Θw|2, (59)
sζ =
σe
σd
·
∣∣∣h˜Hw∣∣∣ . (60)
According to (36), ξ2 =
∣∣gHa∣∣2 =∑Nsi=1 a2i g˜i2, while g˜i and
g˜j (i 6= j) are independent of one another. Thus, we can
compute the PDF of ξ2 by the characteristic function method.
Specifically, according to the previous conclusion that g˜i is a
complex Gaussian variable with its mean and variance being
σe
(√
ρi −√ρ0
)
/σd · hi and σ2e(1 − ρi), the characteristic
function of Fg˜i2(x) denoting the CDF of g˜i
2
is given by
Φg˜i2(̟) =
(
1
1− 2j̟σ2i
)
e
j̟s˜i
2
1−2j̟σ2
i . (61)
Thus, the characteristic function of Fξ2(x) denoting the CDF
of ξ2 is given by
Φξ2(̟) =
Ns∏
i=1
Φg˜i2(a
2
i̟). (62)
Then, the PDF of ξ2 is given by
fξ2(x) = lim
T→∞
1
2π
∫ T
−T
e−j̟xΦξ2(̟)d̟. (63)
Let µ = φPζ2 and ν = 1 + (1 − φ)Pξ2. The PDFs of µ
and ν are given by
Algorithm 3 Secrecy Rate under Secrecy Outage Constraint
Input: ε, P, h, E [gi], etc.;
Output: R∗s ;
1: Initialize: R∗s = 0, ∆, ǫ;
2: Solve (26) to obtain a;
3: Solve (46) to obtain W;
4: Find ŵ to (32) by Projection Approximation Procedure;
5: Find R∗s and the corresponding w by Algorithm 1;
6: Solve (53) to obtain φ0 by bisection method;
7: φ← φ0 −∆/2;
8: repeat
9: Solve (67) to obtain Rs by bisection method under ǫ;
10: R∗s ← max {R∗s , Rs};
11: φ← φ+ ǫ;
12: until φ > φ0 +∆/2
fµ(x) =
fζ2(x)(
x
φP )
φP
, (64)
fν(x) =
fξ2
(
x
(1−φ)P − 1(1−φ)P
)
(1 − φ)P . (65)
On this basis, the CDF of δe =
µ
ν can be computed as follows.
Fδe(x) = Pr (δe ≤ x) (66a)
= Pr
(µ
ν
≤ x
)
(66b)
= Pr (µ ≤ νx, ν > 1) (66c)
=
∫ ∞
1
(∫ νx
0
fµ(µ)dµ
)
fν(ν)dν, (66d)
From Problem (19), we observe that the maximum Rs must
occur in the extreme case of pout (Rs) = ε. Thus,
ε = 1− Fδe(
δd + 1
2Rs
− 1). (67)
By solving (67), the achievable secrecy rate Rs for any
φ within a narrow range around φ0 can be obtained. The
maximum value R∗s among all these Rs is the suboptimal
solution to the problem (19). Now the procedure of our
proposed AN-aided beamforming design based on correlation
is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Note that although the closed-form solution to fξ2(x) and
Fδe(x) are not available, we can compute it quickly via
numerical integration. Up to present, the proposed channel-
correlation-enabled transmit design has been introduced thor-
oughly.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, computer simulations are performed to
evaluate the secrecy performance achieved by the proposed
channel-correlation-enabled AN-aided beamforming scheme.
A. Validating Channel Model
Before illustrating the secrecy performance, we first validate
the correctness of the channel model succinctly formulating
9TABLE I: Simulation parameters for validating the correctness
of the correlated wiretap channel model.
βd βe ρ h
2 S
case 1 1 1 0.5 0.1535 106
case 2 1 1 0.3 0.2826 106
case 3 1 1 0.7 1.6469 106
case 4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4681 106
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Fig. 2: Validating the correctness of the correlated wiretap
channel model.
the relationship between main and wiretap channels by sim-
ulated data. In the simulation, four cases are given, which
involved the parameters the channel gain variances σ2d and
σ2e , the power correlation coefficient ρ between main and
wiretap channels, and the sample size S. For the main channel
gain in a time slot, it can be generated by sampling from
Rayleigh distribution. The power of main channel gain and
the parameters are listed in Table I. Fig. 2 presents the
probability distribution of wiretap channel according to (8)
and the statistical result of simulated data which are sampled
by (1). It is clear that the statistical result roughly agrees with
the probability distribution, which validates the correctness of
the proposed channel model.
B. Secrecy Performance
We start by investigate how the correlation coefficient be-
tween main and wiretap channels affects the secrecy rate under
the transmit power and secrecy outage constraint. Then, the
secrecy rate under the secrecy outage constraint with respect
to the total transmit power is given. Next, the secrecy rate
under the transmit power constraint versus the secrecy outage
TABLE II: Simulation parameters.
σ2d σ
2
e ρ ε P Ns
Rs vs. ρ 1 1 - 0.15 10dBW 8
Rs vs. P 1 1 0.5 0.15 - 8
Rs vs. ε 1 1 0.5 - 10dBW 8
Rs vs. Ns 1 1 0.5 0.15 10dBW -
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Fig. 3: The relationship between the power correlation coeffi-
cient ρ and the achievable secrecy rate Rs.
probability are presented. Finally, how the secrecy rate under
the transmit power and secrecy outage constraint depends on
the number of the transmit antennas is shown. In simulations,
the solid curve represents the proposed channel-correlation-
enabled AN-aided beamforming scheme, while the red dashed
curve represents the traditional scheme that the information-
bearing signal is transmitted in the direction of main channel
and AN is uniformly embedded into the null space of main
channel. It is worth mentioning that, for independent main
and wiretap channels, when the optimization objective is the
secrecy rate under the transmit power and secrecy outage
constraint, the traditional scheme is the best existing one.
Meanwhile, the brute-force scheme corresponding to the blue
dashed curve is also presented. Compared to the proposed
scheme, the only difference is that the brute-force scheme
employs brute-force search to obtain the power allocation
coefficient.
In simulations, the correlation coefficient between main and
wiretap channels is measured by ρ, which indicates the expec-
tation of channel correlation in wireless environment. And the
correlation for each subchannel from Alice to Bob and Eve is
assumed to uniformly fluctuate between [ρ− 0.2, ρ+ 0.2].
1) Rs vs. ρ: Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the
power correlation coefficient ρ and the achievable secrecy
rate Rs. As shown in TABLE II, some parameters in the
simulation are set as follows: the number of antennas at
Alice is Ns = 8; the required secrecy outage probability is
ε = 0.15; the variances of h and g, related to the path loss
as a function of distance, are set as σ2d = σ
2
e = 1; and
the total transmit power P = 10 dBW. We observe that Rs
depends largely on ρ. As ρ increase, Rs declined rapidly.
That means that the correlation between main and wiretap
channels is harmful to the transmission security, especially
when the correlation is high. This result is consistent with our
experience and knowledge. We also observe that the proposed
scheme achieves greater percent gains of Rs with ρ increasing
compared to the traditional scheme. The reason is that, higher
correlation contributes to acquiring more knowledge about
wiretap channel and the transmit optimization specific to
correlated main and wiretap channels becomes definitely more
10
-3 0 3 6 9 12 15
 P(dBW)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
R
s(
b
p
s/
H
z)
8 9 10 11 12
1.8
2.2
2.6
3
3.4
Proposed scheme
Traditional scheme
Brute-force scheme
Fig. 4: The relationship between the total transmit power P
and the achievable secrecy rate Rs.
effective. On the other hand, the achievable performance of
the proposed scheme is very close to the brute-force scheme,
which verifies the usefulness of the proposed algorithm of
power allocation, which works almost as well as brute-force
search with much lower computational complexity.
2) Rs vs. P : Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the
total transmit power P and the achievable secrecy rate Rs. As
shown in TABLE II, some parameters in the simulation are
set as follows: the number of antennas at Alice is Ns = 8; the
required secrecy outage probability is ε = 0.15; the variances
of h and g, related to the path loss as a function of distance,
are set as σ2d = σ
2
e = 1; and the power correlation coefficient
ρ = 0.5. It can be clearly seen that Rs depends largely on
P . With P increasing, Rs becomes large. Despite such a fact,
the excessively large power provides less benefit. For example,
when P changes from 12 dBW to 15 dBW, the power increases
by half but Rs only grows by approximately 25%. On the
other hand, the proposed scheme achieves higher Rs with ρ
increasing compared to the traditional scheme. It indicates that
the channel correlation can be regarded as a resource to the
optimize the transmission so as to further strengthen security.
Like the previous simulation, the achievable performance of
the proposed scheme is very close to the brute-force scheme
with P increasing, which reconfirms that the proposed algo-
rithm of power allocation works almost as well as brute-force
search.
3) Rs vs. ε: Fig. 5 shows the relationship between the
secrecy outage probability ε and the achievable secrecy rate
Rs. As shown in TABLE II, some parameters in the simulation
are set as follows: the number of antennas at Alice is Ns = 8;
the variances of h and g, related to the path loss as a
function of distance, are set as σ2d = σ
2
e = 1; and the power
correlation coefficient ρ = 0.5; and and the total transmit
power P = 10 dBW. We observe that an increase in ε causes
a rapid increase in Rs, which conforms to practical secrecy
communications. Moreover, the proposed scheme grows faster
than the traditional scheme, which means that optimizing
the beamformer for the information-bearing signal and the
power distribution of AN in the null space of main channel
can facilitate the secrecy. In accordance with the previous
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Fig. 5: The relationship between the secrecy outage probability
ε and the achievable secrecy rate Rs.
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Fig. 6: The relationship between the number of transmit
antenna Ns and the achievable secrecy rate Rs.
two simulation results, the achievable performance of the
proposed scheme is very close to the brute-force scheme and
works almost as well as brute-force search with much lower
computational complexity.
4) Rs vs. Ns: Fig. 6 shows the relationship between the
number of transmit antenna Ns and the achievable secrecy rate
Rs. As shown in TABLE II, some parameters in the simulation
are set as follows: the required secrecy outage probability is
ε = 0.15; the variances of h and g, related to the path loss
as a function of distance, are set as σ2d = σ
2
e = 1; and the
power correlation coefficient ρ = 0.5; and the total transmit
power P = 10 dBW. We observe that an increase in Ns
contributes to improving Rs. The reason is that the increase
of antennas can provide more spatial degrees of freedom.
By comparison, it is not difficult that, the secrecy rate of
the proposed scheme is always above that of the traditional
scheme. In accordance with the previous three simulation
results, the achievable performance of the proposed scheme
is very close to the brute-force scheme and works almost
as well as brute-force search with much lower computational
complexity. These simulation results confirm the superiority,
effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed scheme together.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies channel-correlation-enabled AN-aided
beamforming design for correlated MISO wiretap channels,
aiming at maximizing the secrecy rate under the transmit
power and secrecy outage constraint. By exploiting the cor-
relation, the wiretap channel is formulated as the sum of
both determinate and random components, which describes
wiretap channels precisely and succinctly. Based on this, the
power of AN in the null space of main channel is placed
more reasonably instead of simple uniform distribution. And
the beamformer for information-bearing signal is optimized
specific to the scenario of correlation. Then, an efficient al-
gorithm for power allocation between the information-bearing
signal and the AN is developed. Simulation results show that
the secrecy rate under the transmit power and secrecy outage
constraint is improved significantly.
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